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1. Introduction 
 During and after the European currency crisis, many research studies confirmed that fiscal 
deterioration increased long-term interest rates in the Euro area. To the best of our knowledge, no 
study denies this relationship.
1
 However, countries such as Japan, whose public debt is more than 
250% of GDP, did not encounter any increase in their long-term interest rates. Also, as summarized 
in Laubach (2011), previous literature following Plosser’s (1982) seminal study documents that an 
increase in government deficits or debt either has statistically insignificant effects on interest rates or 
raises them by a statistically significant but economically modest amount. In short, the relationship 
between fiscal deterioration and long-term interest rates is still controversial. 
The following three factors make identifying this relationship challenging. First, financial 
markets have a forward-looking nature. Any data including fiscal information only contains past 
information prior to its release. Thus, no statistical analysis using released fiscal data captures 
rational market participants’ forward-looking behavior. The second reason is endogeneity. It is 
possible that a shock that decreases interest rates worsens fiscal conditions within the same period, 
which leads an endogeneity problem. The third reason is the low frequency of fiscal data. Under an 
efficient financial market, interest rates change momentarily to reflect changes in expectations about 
various factors, including fiscal variables. On the other hand, the frequency of fiscal data is quarterly 
at most. Thus, any statistical analysis using this low-frequency data is not sufficient to discuss the 
relationship between interest rates and fiscal conditions. 
A possible answer for this cumbersome question would be an event study. For example, 
Wachtel and Young’s (1987) seminal event study in this literature regresses the difference between 
expectations by, say, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and budget deficits release on the 
daily difference of interest rates assuming market efficiency. Also, Quigley and Porter-Hudak (1994) 
exploited Box and Tiao’s (1975) intervention analysis through which the relationship can be 
confirmed when the dummy variables are statistically significant. Since only an unexpected change 
                                               
1
 Some studies emphasize the role of global risk factors although they appreciate the effects of fiscal 
deterioration on interest rates. See Longstaff et al. (2011), Cimadomo et al. (2016).  
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among market participants moves asset prices in efficient markets, these methods seem to be 
sufficient to resolve the three problems mentioned above. 
However, the unexpected changes of fiscal conditions among market participants do not 
convey solely CBO forecasts. Other forecast releases, such as the IMF’s and private experts’ 
forecasts, could be considered as unexpected changes. Thus, it is preferable to count all fiscal 
conditions forecast releases and regard all these releases as an “event” reflected a dummy variable in 
the analysis. However, as is easily imagined, this is impossible because of the degree of freedom in 
the statistical analysis. 
 This study proposes a new method employing a sentiment index that is often utilized in 
stock market studies. Although several methods are proposed to capture market sentiment, we 
compute it by counting the number of newspaper article releases on a given day which contain one 
or a few specific words, similar to a study conducted by Baker et al. (2016). Therefore, a regression 
of interest rates on this index can be seen as a simple extension of event studies in which each of the 
releases is regarded as a separate event. Based on this idea, we evaluate in this paper the fiscal policy 
effects on interest rates. 
The advantage of this method is that it includes events we have missed so far. However, 
the method suffers from problems: (1) we do not distinguish between positive and negative articles’ 
effects on interest rates; and (2) we implicitly assume every event impacts interest rates by the same 
magnitude. Thus, in the paper, we deal with these problems by (1) dividing the articles into positive, 
negative, and irrelevant using the textual analysis technique; and (2) weighting the articles by the 
number of characters and/or an inverse of each article’s number of pages. Additionally, (3) we 
compute a sub-index, such as the macro-policy cluster sub-index and fiscal cluster sub-index, based 
on the combination of words before and after the specific word using the cluster analysis. By using 
these sub-indices we can see what fiscal policy factors affect interest rates the most.  
We focus on the Japanese government bond (JGB) markets in this study. The reasons are 
as follows. First, the market is considered as ideal to find fiscal deterioration’s effects on interest 
rates. It is well known that the Japanese fiscal situation is the worst among the OECD countries. 
Second, long time series data is available for this market. In fact, we utilize daily time series from 
June 13, 1989 to March 24, 2017. Such a long series is not available in Europe owing to the 
introduction of the currency union. Finally, foreigners hold a small share of JGB. At the end of 2017, 
this share was only 6.1%. This means that we can almost ignore exchange rates and country risks. 
Furthermore, the market is resistant to shocks seen in other countries that propagate through 
international diversified investments. This aspect is more relevant to our purpose than to analysis of 
more open markets such as the U.S.  
 The remainder of this paper consists four sections. In section 2 we describe the data and 
how we compute the sentiment index. Section 3 presents our empirical results. In section 4, we 
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outline the paper’s main conclusions.  
 
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
2.1. Fiscal Sentiment Index 
The fiscal sentiment index’s computation methodology is outlined below. Pre-processed 
data is collected from the Nikkei ― a popular newspaper in Japan comparable with the Wall Street 
Journal and the Financial Times. We use their database Nikkei Telecon 21 and search both the 
morning and the evening editions for the key word “zaisei” meaning “fiscal,” “public finance,” or 
“(government) budget.” We retrieve 134,742 articles covering the period from January 1 in 1980 to 
March 24 in 2017 although we discard them within the first three years because of its imperfect 
uploading. Then we classify these articles into positive, negative or irrelevant. To do this, we first try 
applying a commercial-based textual analytics engine (“Nazuki” produced by NTT DATA 
Corporation), especially in order to ensure objectivity. However, criticisms has arisen such that, for 
example, news about new tax hike can be classified either as positive (fiscal soundness view) or as 
negative (tax payer’s view). Therefore, we here adopt the standard procedure of the textual analysis 
as follows. First, we pick up 1000 articles randomly and classify them into the three categories 
explained above based on the author’s decision. Second, we construct a codebook and then built the 
naive Bayes classifier. By using this, we classify all of the articles and compute the fiscal sentiment 
index explained below. It should be noted that some may consider this procedure is too subjective. 
However, as far as we use the textual analysis, to construct the codebook is essential and inevitable. 
We should note as well that this procedure is better than what we had done to perform the traditional 
event study. 
In order to compute the fiscal sentiment index, we first employ the number of positive and 
negative articles for each day. Then, we define the fiscal sentiment index as their difference: 
 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑡 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 
𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑡 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠          (1) 
𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝐼𝐷𝑋)𝑡 = 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑡  − 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑡 
 
Computing these, we assume the index affect financial markets on the same trading day. It should be 
noted that the evening edition contains information released before approximately 2 p.m. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to consider the articles in the evening edition can affect the closing yield on the same 
day. As for the day after non-business day of Sundays and holidays, we calculate the index as an 
daily average of the number of articles among the day and the non-business days.  
As mentioned in Section 1, this index per se is computed assuming that the magnitude of 
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impact for any article is the same. However, it would be standard to assume that each impact is 
different depending on the size and the page it prints on. Thus, the following three indices are 
calculated as well: (1) an index based on the number of characters in each article, (2) an index based 
on the inverse of the page the article is printed on in the newspaper, and (3) an index based on the 
previous two figures.  
Figure 1 to 4 shows the computed results. Figure 1 shows the 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑡 and its smoothed one 
during 31 days. The noticeable feature of this index is to successfully capture the two eras of fiscal 
consolidation in Japan: Prime Minister Hashimoto era (1/11/1996 to 7/30/1998) and Prime Minister 
Koizumi era (4/27/2001 to 9/26/2006). The former PM put his heart on the administrative reform 
and its final report is disclosed in public on 12/4/1997. We can see the spike expressing this event in 
the figure. However, before and after this disclosure, the recession caused by the financial crisis in 
Japan disturbs this consolidation movement and he abandons his administrative and fiscal reform. 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑡 reflects this movement very clearly, thereby we can considered this 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑡 as reliable. Also, 
this index traces well the second movement by Prime Minister Koizumi. His predecessors, Mr. 
Obuchi and Mr. Mori, are notorious as a big spender thus the index is low during their eras 
(7/31/1998 to 4/26/2001). However, the index starts to increase after the appointment of Mr. 
Koizumi and records the highest on June 22 in 2001 when he declares his first economic plan. 
Thereafter, the index keeps higher than that in the other administration, so the index capture Mr. 
Koizumi’s fiscal reform well. 
𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑡 depicted in Figure 2 shows the mirror image of Figure 1. For example, during the 
administration of Prime Minister Obuchi and Mori, we can see an increase in 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑡. Figure 3 is the 
(plain) fiscal sentiment index, which is simply calculated as the difference between the positive 
index and the negative one. We can see that this index explains the above stories well. Finally, Figure 
4 shows the 4 types of fiscal sentiment index explained above. Since indices weighted by the number 
of letters in each article has a big number, we prepare for the right axis in the figure. As is easily 
understand, the indices move around almost together, thus their effects on long-term interest rates are 
expected as the same. 
 
2.2. Estimation Equation 
In order to investigate how the change in fiscal sentiment affects long-term interest rates, 
we estimate the following equation: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = α + β ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑘
𝑡
0 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖 𝐶𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (2) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡 is the 10-year JGB closing yield, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 is the fiscal sentiment index, and 𝜀𝑡 is a 
disturbance term. It should be noted that we should use the accumulation of the number of articles to 
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accommodate our estimation to the efficient market hypothesis. 𝐶𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control 
variables that drives yield changes. It includes: (1) the uncollateralized overnight call rate as a proxy 
for short-term interest rates that explains effects of monetary policy, (2) a level of 
seasonally-adjusted base money that controls the effects of the zero interest rate policy by the Bank 
of Japan from 2/12/1999 to 8/11/2000, (3) the average Nikkei stock volatility index that captures a 
change in market participants’ risk attitude, which is suggested to be included in previous research 
(Beber et al., 2009, Lauback, 2011; Kilponenn et al., 2015), (4) the US 10-year treasury yield in the 
previous business day. In spite that the sentiment index is computed from January 1 in 1983, the 
sample period starts from June 13 in 1989 when the volatility index becomes available and ends on 
March 18 in 2001, the previous day when the Bank of Japan started their unconventional monetary 
policy including quantitative easing by purchasing the JGB. Holidays including Saturday and 
Sunday are excluded from our sample. 
The uncollateralized overnight call rate is a policy, thereby exogenous variable, and the US 
10-year treasury yield is predetermined because the New York market has been closed when Tokyo 
market opens. In contrast, the volatility index is an endogenous one, therefore we have to care about 
the endogeneity problem. Also, independent variables but the volatility are integrated of order one, 
I(1), based on the DF-GLS test (unshown). In order to deal with these two problems, we adopt the 
fully-modified instrumental variable method (FM-IV) developed Hansen and Phillips (1990). By 
using this FM-IV, we can obtain consistent estimators and unbiased standard normal distribution of 
I(1) independent variables under the assumption that the independent variables are not cointegrated, 
although the coefficient of I(0) variable may be inconsistent when the instruments are invalid. 
 
3. Estimation Results 
As shown in Table 1, the index have significant negative effects on long-term interest rates, 
therefore, we can say that fiscal conditions do affects long-term interest rates as suggested by 
conventional wisdom. This is our main result. Also, the index is significant regardless of the type 
(Column 2 to 4). Thus, the weights for the indices ― the number of letters and the page number of 
the articles ― are considered not to have important role. Moreover, these results are invariant when 
we control the temporary overshooting effects (Column 5 to 8). 
Table 2 shows the results when we divide the index into the positive and negative ones. As 
expected, the coefficient of the negative and positive indices are positive and negative, respectively. 
This outcome is unchanged even if we control the temporary effects similar to Table 1 (Column 5 to 
8). Finally, the case where 5-year yields are employed as the independent variable is presented in 
Table 3. The results is almost the same as those for 10-year yields, but the significance level of the 
indices is low more or less. However, this result would be reasonable because the default risk should 
be reflected more to longer maturity bonds under apparently stable bond markets.  
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4. Concluding Remarks 
This study analyzes the relationship between long-term interest rates and a fiscal sentiment 
index originally developed by conducting textual analysis of newspaper articles. Daily frequency 
regression shows that the fiscal sentiment has significant effects on long-term interest rates as 
suggested by the conventional wisdom.  
 Many points remain to be considered. First, we could obtain more fruitful outcome if we 
can divide movements of long-term interest rates into crowding-out component and default risk 
component. Second, we should perform regression analyses in separated sample periods utilizing the 
sufficient length of our time series data. Although we could find interesting points furthermore, they 
are reserved for future studies. 
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Table 1: Effects of the fiscal sentiment index on the 10-year JGB yields. 
 
Note ) *** means significant at the 0.01 level, ** means significant at the 0.05 level, and * means significant at the 0.10 level. t-values are 
shown below the coefficients. Sample period is from 6/13/1989 to 3/18/2001 (n=2611).  
 
 
 
 
 
None Inv. Page Num. letters Both None Inv. Page Num. letters Both
Constant 77.1359 *** 74.9116 *** 61.1998 *** 66.8799 *** 77.1007 *** 74.8679 *** 61.1520 *** 66.8156 ***
(7.937) (7.439) (12.344) (9.715) (7.933) (7.432) (12.302) (9.689)
US 10-year note yield 0.4353 *** 0.4285 *** 0.4247 *** 0.4176 *** 0.4349 *** 0.4283 *** 0.4254 *** 0.4179 ***
(11.306) (11.081) (11.045) (10.788) (11.139) (10.957) (10.924) (10.666)
Call rate, O/N 0.4383 *** 0.4221 *** 0.4385 *** 0.4299 *** 0.4381 *** 0.4219 *** 0.4384 *** 0.4297 ***
(11.540) (11.546) (11.685) (11.586) (11.535) (11.543) (11.677) (11.578)
Nikkei stock volatility index -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0015
(-0.517) (-0.601) (-0.266) (-0.378) (-0.516) (-0.601) (-0.269) (-0.382)
Level of base money, seasonally adjusted -6.0019 *** -5.8132 *** -4.7548 *** -5.1869 *** -5.9986 *** -5.8094 *** -4.7515 *** -5.1819 ***
(-7.708) (-7.232) (-11.899) (-9.402) (-7.704) (-7.227) (-11.869) (-9.381)
Dummy for the first day after holidays -0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0047 -0.0044 -0.0050 -0.0046 -0.0045 -0.0044
(-0.075) (-0.074) (-0.087) (-0.081) (-0.091) (-0.083) (-0.083) (-0.081)
Accumulated fiscal sentiment index -0.0008 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0002 ***
(3.049) (2.704) (3.146) (2.901) (3.042) (2.699) (3.143) (2.894)
Fiscal sentiment index on the day -0.0026 -0.0041 0.0002 -0.0001
(-0.256) (-0.203) (0.192) (-0.059)
Weight Weight
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Table 2: Effects of the positive and the negative sentiment index on the 10-year JGB yields. 
 
Note ) *** means significant at the 0.01 level, ** means significant at the 0.05 level, and * means significant at the 0.10 level. t-values are 
shown below the coefficients. Sample period is from 6/13/1989 to 3/18/2001 (n=2611).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None Inv. page Num. letters Both None Inv. page Num. letters Both
Constant 34.5085 ** 32.0219 ** 24.7558 21.8430 33.4450 ** 30.9498 * 24.1895 21.4788
(2.188) (1.996) (1.563) (1.382) (2.118) (1.927) (1.530) (1.362)
US 5-year note yield 0.3957 *** 0.3898 *** 0.3966 *** 0.3842 *** 0.3970 *** 0.3914 *** 0.3974 *** 0.3850 ***
(9.782) (9.598) (9.980) (9.732) (9.690) (9.542) (9.910) (9.662)
Call rate, O/N 0.4067 *** 0.3879 *** 0.3794 *** 0.3729 *** 0.3977 *** 0.3800 *** 0.3720 *** 0.3664 ***
(11.149) (11.076) (9.977) (10.260) (10.312) (10.424) (9.536) (9.860)
Nikkei stock volatility index 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001
(0.023) (-0.035) (-0.056) (0.080) (-0.032) (-0.079) (-0.101) (0.035)
Level of base money, seasonally adjusted -2.6444 ** -2.4363 * -1.8684 -1.6329 -2.5547 ** -2.3469 * -1.8182 -1.5992
(-2.120) (-1.922) (-1.493) (-1.309) (-2.045) (-1.850) (-1.456) (-1.284)
Dummy for the first day after holidays -0.0048 -0.0047 -0.0054 -0.0052 -0.0148 -0.0172 -0.0113 -0.0133
(-0.092) (-0.089) (-0.102) (-0.099) (-0.279) (-0.322) (-0.216) (-0.254)
Accumulated negative index 0.0006 ** 0.0010 * 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 ** 0.0009 0.0000 0.0001
(2.412) (1.824) (1.621) (1.426) (2.154) (1.625) (1.466) (1.294)
Accumulated positive index -0.0011 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0011 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0003 ***
(-3.640) (-3.324) (-3.275) (-3.504) (-3.365) (-3.112) (-3.113) (-3.351)
Negative index on the day -0.0082 -0.0177 -0.0011 -0.0026
(-0.747) (-0.817) (-0.817) (-0.930)
Positive index on the day -0.0140 -0.0346 -0.0016 -0.0041
(-0.807) (-0.979) (-1.099) (-1.085)
Weight Weight
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Table 3: Effects of the fiscal sentiment index on the 5-year JGB yields. 
 
Note ) *** means significant at the 0.01 level, ** means significant at the 0.05 level, and * means significant at the 0.10 level. t-values are 
shown below the coefficients. Sample period is from 6/13/1989 to 3/18/2001 (n=2611).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None Inv. page Num. letters Both None Inv. page Num. letters Both
Constant 67.0588 *** 64.9617 *** 49.3853 *** 55.3202 *** 66.9902 *** 64.8476 *** 49.2816 *** 55.1686 ***
(6.333) (5.939) (9.251) (7.433) (6.327) (5.928) (9.219) (7.405)
US 5-year note yield 0.3727 *** 0.3660 *** 0.3654 *** 0.3571 *** 0.3732 *** 0.3665 *** 0.3670 *** 0.3582 ***
(10.642) (10.404) (10.331) (10.049) (10.525) (10.321) (10.251) (9.968)
Call rate, O/N 0.6223 *** 0.6066 *** 0.6082 *** 0.6067 *** 0.6222 *** 0.6063 *** 0.6077 *** 0.6061 ***
(15.101) (15.344) (14.854) (15.021) (15.096) (15.339) (14.842) (15.008)
Nikkei stock volatility index -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0011
(-0.311) (-0.376) (-0.212) (-0.249) (-0.316) (-0.383) (-0.220) (-0.260)
Level of base money, seasonally adjusted -5.2685 *** -5.0906 *** -3.8789 *** -4.3352 *** -5.2635 *** -5.0818 *** -3.8716 *** -4.3237 ***
(-6.208) (-5.826) (-8.963) (-7.246) (-6.202) (-5.816) (-8.938) (-7.221)
Dummy for the first day after holidays -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0034
(-0.054) (-0.053) (-0.066) (-0.062) (-0.046) (-0.048) (-0.056) (-0.056)
Accumulated fiscal sentiment index -0.0008 *** -0.0015 ** -0.0001 ** -0.0002 ** -0.0008 *** -0.0015 ** -0.0001 ** -0.0002 **
(2.773) (2.473) (2.449) (2.420) (2.768) (2.465) (2.441) (2.405)
Fiscal sentiment index on the day 0.0012 0.0017 0.0006 0.0006
(0.107) (0.076) (0.507) (0.222)
Weight Weight
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Table 4: Effects of the positive and the negative sentiment index on the 5-year JGB yields. 
 
Note ) *** means significant at the 0.01 level, ** means significant at the 0.05 level, and * means significant at the 0.10 level. t-values are 
shown below the coefficients. Sample period is from 6/13/1989 to 3/18/2001 (n=2611).  
 
None Inv. page Num. letters Both None Inv. page Num. letters Both
Constant 49.7426 *** 48.0846 *** 44.0864 *** 42.3429 ** 48.4098 *** 46.8246 *** 43.4177 *** 41.8191 **
(2.967) (2.810) (2.631) (2.507) (2.886) (2.735) (2.596) (2.481)
US 5-year note yield 0.4751 *** 0.4671 *** 0.4707 *** 0.4566 *** 0.4785 *** 0.4702 *** 0.4731 *** 0.4591 ***
(11.047) (10.786) (11.194) (10.821) (10.992) (10.754) (11.154) (10.782)
Call rate, O/N 0.5764 *** 0.5588 *** 0.5686 *** 0.5602 *** 0.5660 *** 0.5502 *** 0.5614 *** 0.5531 ***
(14.861) (14.963) (14.131) (14.419) (13.814) (14.158) (13.603) (13.928)
Nikkei stock volatility index -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0008
(-0.170) (-0.281) (-0.152) (-0.148) (-0.240) (-0.338) (-0.201) (-0.204)
Level of base money, seasonally adjusted -3.9782 *** -3.8321 *** -3.5297 *** -3.3805 ** -3.8680 *** -3.7286 *** -3.4730 *** -3.3350 **
(-3.00) (-2.835) (-2.666) (-2.535) (-2.915) (-2.757) (-2.628) (-2.506)
Dummy for the first day after holidays -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0056 -0.0055 -0.0148 -0.0176 -0.0108 -0.0138
(-0.093) (-0.092) (-0.101) (-0.099) (-0.262) (-0.309) (-0.195) (-0.246)
Accumulated negative index 0.0007 *** 0.0013 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0006 ** 0.0012 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(2.631) (2.200) (2.352) (2.179) (2.355) (1.991) (2.202) (2.038)
Accumulated positive index -0.0008 ** -0.0015 ** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 ** -0.0007 ** -0.0014 * 0.0000 ** 0.0000 **
(-2.308) (-1.977) (-2.133) (-2.126) (-2.062) (-1.788) (-1.996) (-1.984)
Negative index on the day -0.0031 -0.0085 0.0000 0.0000
(-0.268) (-0.368) (-0.345) (-0.514)
Positive index on the day -0.0234 -0.0502 0.0000 -0.0001
(-1.270) (-1.332) (-1.405) (-1.417)
Weight Weight
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Figure 1: The number of positive articles 
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Figure 2: The number of negative articles 
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Figure 3: Fiscal sentiment index 
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Figure 4: Comparison among 4 types of fiscal sentiment indices 
 
 
 
